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Is Chess Art? 
Catherine Lord 
A standard examination question in Russia: "ls chess sport, art, or 
science? ' We assume the question is confined to young aspiring chess 
players, but, given the seriousness with which chess is taken in Russia, 
it might be set for students in any of these three areas. The question is 
in no sense academic. Grand masters enjoy debating the issue. Anat­
oly Karpov says "For me it is one, then another, then a third." Then 
"Today, of course, chess is above all a sport." His reasons are conce� 
tual as well as empirical. "Don't you agree that in any competition on 
any level, the important question is who wins?"1 Richard Reti and 
James Rachels have argued that chess is both a game and art. For them 
it is an art because it involves "creative activity whose products are 
worthy of attention for their own sakes." I shall urge that chess is not 
art. 
The Reti-Rachels comparison between the struggle in art and in 
chess is not very illuminating. Struggles pervade so many of our activ­
ities that the concept cannot reveal the nature of any particular activ­
ity. True, both chess and art involve a psychological struggle. Shelby 
Lyman emphasized this when he commented on the second game of 
the current World Championship. Near the end, both Karpov and 
.Kasparov were under time pressure. Well, Michelangelo was under 
time pressure while completing the Sistine Chapel. Unlike artists, 
chess players have opponents. (Rachels does not respect this fact 
enough. )  Perhaps clients, adaptors, and directors fill the opponent's 
place for art. Does the player's struggle with the constraints of the 
game correspond to the artist's struggle with his or her medium? The 
parallel applies to competitive chess. It is ironic that it does not apply 
where Rachels is on strongest ground, namely, to compositional 
chess. In any case struggling is not of the essence. 
Of the essence is creativty. Both chess and art require the creative 
or productive imagination. With the word, ucreative," used so pro­
miscuously 'today, someone might charge that this parallel is no more 
illuminating than the struggle parallel. Jack Glickman offers an imme­
diate reply. His thesis not only gives specificity, but also puts creativ­
ity in chess and art on a par in one definite respect. In "Creativity in 
the Arts," Glickman says "Particulars are made, types created. "2 To 
use for the most part my own examples, a member of the Sacher fam­
ily created a type of cake, the usacher Torte" Brigitte Bardot created 
the "Bardot look," and Titian created the "Titian blue. "  There is a 
"look" . in chess. It is found in the style introduced by Reti, among 
others. It is hyper-modern chess characterized by a certain indirect- 2
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ness. For example, the fianchetto of the bishop tends to be favored . 
This style has a certain looLc. So there is the uhyper-modern look, ,  
just as there is the " Bardot look." These are two created types. Moves 
can also be types. For instance, the Ruy Lopez opening is also a type . 
Thus in both chess and art we find creativity with respect to the crea­
tion of types. 
Most philosophers take care to exclude creating such things as a 
mess or a disturbance by positing the condition that to be considered 
.creative a process must produce something "valuably new." Glickman 
assumes that "creating me.an.s producing something valuably new" 
(italics his). A moment's hesitation: what about Tal's dreaded stare. It 
depends, in part, on what is included in the game. Finally, in ucreativ­
ity in Art," Vincent Tomas insists that a necessary condition for crea­
tivity is "critical control.' '3 No one doubts this in chess. 
C. J. Ducasse distinguishes between ectotelic, endotelic and auto­
telic activities ... His use of these terms is a bit puzzling, but the distinc­
tions are worth making and I will use the terms for my own purposes. 
Work is ectotelic or heterotelic because the end of the activity is out­
side it and the steps of the activity are seen as means. Art is autotelic. 
Its end is "real" because it is "contained" in the activity. The end of 
art is the objectification of emotion and this is part and parcel of the 
expressive art-activity. Play is endotelic because its end is a "trumped 
up one,''  invented "expressly" to initiate the game. Unlike art, play is 
not serious for it is not impelled by our innermost being. Yet Ducasse 
says that "playing chess . . .  so long as it is playing could not be a me.ans 
to mating the opponent's king" (italics mine ). On the contrary, the 
moves in a game of chess are means to checkmating the opponent's 
king. However, and this is very important, chess is not ectotelic. Its 
goal is not outside the playing. "Endotelic" and "autotelic" are not so 
far removed in meaning. Chess is autotelic in the sense that the end 
cannot be attained without the play. Health may be regained without 
the pill. The sun may melt the snow so that one does not have to 
shovel the sidewalk. God can say, "Let there be a house! " But the 
king cannot be checkmated, even by God, without the playing. 
Ducasse speaks of the impulse to express as being a categorical 
imperative. By contrast George Santayana says that art 0belongs to the 
holiday side" of our lives. Perhaps chess, at its best, also belongs to 
the holiday side of our lives in which case this is the second sense in 
which chess is autotelic. 
To a large extent Rachels' argument for chess as art turns on 
beauty. There are, of course, other aesthetic values, for instance, 
expressiveness. Furthermore, some philosophers, Tolstoi, Ducasse, 
and Collingwood, to name only a few, think beauty not essential to 
art. For different reasons artists today would agree. While we examine 
Rachels' discussion of playing for beauty, the distinction between 
3
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competitive and compositional chess must be kept in mind. Karpov is 
thinking of competitive or, more specifically, tournament chess when 
he says "( Actually, playing beautiful chess in the attempt to achieve 
good results is being seen more and more . . .  )" He calls this "irra­
tional. " He, himself, will not take any chance on losing even if that 
chance is "only one in ten."  Although he describes Boris Spassky as 
playing "brilliantly" in a game in which he decided to play for beauty , 
he calls the game < 'sad" because Spassky sacrificed the "simple" and 
"sure" road to victory. ln the present context this is ironic, for sim­
plicity is one of Rachels' cardinal beauty-making features. In competi­
tive chess there is always an opponent to be considered. He may not 
be willing to cc pursue beauty as well as points. " 
It is standard in tournament chess to give a prize for the best game 
and a prize for the most beautiful game. The second is called the ' <bril­
liancy prize." The beautiful game must be sound. If a game is very 
beautiful, but flawed, the judges are extremely reluctant to give it the 
prize. They will do so, again reluctantly, only if the flaw is very diffi­
cult to discover. The beautiful game must be sound as well as beauti­
ful to win the award for the most beautiful game. 
Rachels is on firmest ground in compositional chess where there is 
no opponent. The player sits by himself composing positions for, say, 
the end game. But these are positions for winning. The aim is to teach. 
Not only that, grand masters often use positions thus contrived. In 
fact, the Saavedra theme has been used in tournament chess. The 
purely aesthetic seems to be secured by Santayana's suggestion that 
interest in chess is ninterest in formal relations, as in mathematics or 
stained glass or arabesques . "  This gives us chess as an aesthetic object, 
but, as I shall argue later, it does not give us chess as art. Before I go 
into the chess-as-aesthetic-object-implies-chess-can-be-art issue, I 
would like to discuss more parallels between chess and art, both 
Rachels' and my own. 
Rachels' comparison between the delightful surprises afforded by 
art and chess is suggestive. For one thing, it introduces the crucial 
phenomenon of expectation in chess and art, especially music. Leo­
nard Meyer has applied information theory to musical expectation. 
For him greatness in music consists in the amount of information a 
piece conveys.s To use my own example, a steeple chase gives more 
information than a race between two horses because fewer possibilites 
are cancelled. Meyer points out that Twinkle Twinkle, Little Star yields 
less information than the theme for Geminiani's Opus 3 ,  No. 3. The 
latter, in tum, gives less information than the theme for Bach's Prelude 
and Fugue for organ. Less informative musical works set up fewer 
expectations and fewer possibilities. They are likely to be cliche­
ridden and offer less resistance to the "musical impulse. , , 
One form of resistance Meyer does not entertain is the surprise 
4
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that is totaUy unexpected as in Rachels' Saavedra example. The phe­
nomenon is fairly rare in music. Nevertheless it does occur in Hayd­
en's worlc.s.6 In The Creation there is a long twisting passage which 
ends in a C-major. The twisting passage symbolizes chaos. The C­
major climax represents order. This is unexpected and delightful. It 
seems "right" both symbolically and musically. A totally unexpected , 
though perhaps not delightful, surprise ocurs when the slow, genteel 
movement of Hayden's Surprise Symphony is interrupted by a loud 
crash on the dominant. Musically this is logical, but dynamically it is 
unexpected. 
Rachels has overlooked a feature which is essential to art and also 
found in chess. In fact, these features may be a major source of beauty 
in chess. In "Towards a Philosophy of Chess," published in this jour­
nal, Jose A. Benardete points out that chess has expressive properties. i 
While he draws parallels between chess and life and I between chess 
and art, we both employ Nelson Goodman's analysis of expression or, 
more precisely, expressiveness.8 
According to Goodman, expressive properties are metaphorically, 
not literally possessed. To take the standard example, when we say 
that the music is "sad" we are saying that the piece metaphorically 
possess the property of being sad. For Goodman, metaphor involves 
the transfer of a label or labels from one schema or family of labels to 
an unaccustomed realm of application. Thus 'sad' is transported from 
the schema of emotion labels usually applied to the human and animal 
realm to the realm of art, specifically music . 
Benardete's examples of metaphorically possesed properties of 
chess involve many of the central terms used in the game. When we 
say that White is " attacking"' Black, we cannot mean that the player 
of the white pieces is literally attacking the player of the black pieces. 
To turn to chess and art, Mikhail Botvinnik, when describing the play 
of Nigel Short, says that his pieces "dance on the board." The pieces 
metaphorically possess the property of dancing. Once I was taken 
completely by surprise by the "sinister" onslaught of my opponent's 
pawns. Expressive properties afford their own pleasure and can, at 
times, be called beautiful. 
As I have already pointed out, beauty is not the only aesthetic 
value. Furthermore neither rightness and necessity nor simplicity and 
economy are sufficient conditions for beauty. However, Guy Sircello 
in his "new theory of beauty" or NTB, as he calls it, provides an 
avenue which broadens the scope of beauty and may, in a particular 
case, include these properties.9 
According to Sircello, it is an empirical fact that when we find 
something beautiful, we find it beautiful in some respect. To be beau­
tiful is to be beautifully F. One might call this " the adverbial theory 
of beauty." For instance, Helen's skin is beautiful with respect to its 
5
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fairness. Her skin is beautifully fair. The property which renders 
something beautiful must be a qualitative property which is possessed 
to a high degree. It cannot be a quantitative property nor, mo.st 
emphatically, may it be a property of defect such as silliness or the 
smoothness of a tire. I think that to be "breathtaking" and to preempt 
attention the PQDs, properties of qualitative degree as Sircello calls 
them, must be possessed to an usually high degree. This modification 
allows the theory to elude criticism that reduces the PQDs to a dull 
' 'very.' '  
On the basis of NTB we can now say that if rightness or necessity 
are present in a solution to an extremely high degree, then the solu­
tion is beautiful with respect to these PQDs. Correspondingly, if a 
game has the PQPs of simplicity and economy to an especially high 
degree then it is beautiful with respect to these PQPs. A game can be 
beautifully simple. Expressive properties may also be PQPs. My 
opponent's play was beautifully sinister. That is not a property of 
defect in chess! In showing that NTB offers resources for beauty in 
chess, I am not trying to assimiliate all aesthetic properties in chess to 
beauty. After all, a game can simply be simple. Needle% to say, art 
also possesses PQPs. 
We will not be in a position to answer the question, "ls chess art? ", 
until we have addressed Rachels' early question about intentions. He 
wonders whether or not something can be called art if it was not 
intended to be art. He raises the issue only to dismiss it summarily 
with the observation that "There are many works now on display in 
museums that were created by craftsman who gave no thought to 
"art." This facile move bypasses one of the central issues in aesthetics 
today. Undeniably, some things which were never intended to be art 
are used as art. They are framed and enjoyed for their aesthetic prop­
erties. Such objects are prized because we take pleasure in the disin­
terested contemplation of their aesthetic features "for their own 
sake. "  But just because a thing is used as art does not imply that it is 
art. 
Unfortunately, there is a tendency today to use the terms, "aes­
thetic object" and "work of art" interchangeably. This is conceptually 
misleading. Many, if not mo.st things, can be perceived as aesthetic 
objects (whether or not it is rewarding to do so in a particular 
instance is another matter). We can always "bracket" the purely per­
ceptual properties of a thing. For instance we can appreciate the shape 
of a chair and ignore its function. We can look at the snowflakes to 
see if they are so large and lasting that a plow will be needed in the 
morning, or we can appreciate their shape, their whiteness and, the 
way they glisten under a street lamp. But to take something as an aes­
thetic object is not to categorize it as art. Most works of art are ipso 
facto aesthetic objects. Aesthetic objects are not ipso facto works of 
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art. That we can enjoy and admire the aesthetic properties of chess 
does not enable us to claim chess as art. 
One might counter with George Dickie's well known "institutional 
theory of art." Dickie offers the following definition. 10 A worlc of art 
is an .. artifact" some of the features of which have had "conferred" 
upon them the status of " candidate for appreciation" by some person 
or persons acting on behalf of "the artworld." On this definition, can 
any aesthetic object, which is an artifact, become a work of art? It 
would seem so. But Dickie's approach can easily lead to the gerry, 
mandering of the concept, art. For instance, why not st.amps? I submit 
that to call chess 0art" is, precisely to gerrymander the concept. 
NOTES 
I am very grateful to Jose A. Benardete of the Philosophy Department at Syracuse Uni­
versity for background information and guidance with the finer points of chess. 
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